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Summary
Psychopathological symptoms in schizophrenia pa-
tients suggest that the concept of self might be dis-
turbed in these individuals [1]. Delusions of influence
make them feel that someone else is guiding their ac-
tions, and certain kinds of their hallucinations seem
to be misinterpretations of their own inner voice as
an external voice, the common denominator being
that self-produced information is perceived as if com-
ing from outside. If this interpretation were correct,
we might expect that schizophrenia patients might
also attribute the sensory consequences of their own
eye movements to the environment rather than to
themselves, challenging the percept of a stable world.
Indeed, this seems to be the case because we found
a clear correlation between the strength of delusions
of influence and the ability of schizophrenia patients
to cancel out such self-induced retinal information in
motion perception. This correlation reflects direct ex-
perimental evidence supporting the view that delu-
sions of influence in schizophrenia might be due to a
specific deficit in the perceptual compensation of the
sensory consequences of one’s own actions [1–6].
Results
Auditory hallucinations, thought insertions, and delu-
sions of influence have been declared first-rank symp-
toms and hallmarks of psychopathology in schizophre-
nia patients [7]. They belong to the cluster of positive
symptoms in schizophrenia, and this cluster demon-
strates a high interindividual and crosscultural stability*Correspondence: alindner@caltech.edu (A.L.); dleube@ukaachen.
de (D.T.L.)
4Present address: California Institute of Technology, Division of Bi-
ology, Mail Code 216-76, 1200 E. California Boulevard, Pasadena,
California, 91125.and a high positive predictive value for the disorder [8].
In the presence of many of these positive symptoms,
internally generated cognitive phenomena are being
misattributed to the external world, suggesting an im-
paired ability to ascribe agency to self-produced events.
However, despite recent progress in clarifying the patho-
physiological mechanisms of the disorder, the func-
tional bases of disorders of agency have remained elu-
sive. During the last decades, theoretical groundwork
was laid for a further understanding of the mechanisms
that contribute to the perceptual distinction between
sensory events that occur as a result of one’s own ac-
tions and events that occur as the result of someone
else’s actions [9]. Following these ideas, Frith proposed
a cognitive model of self-agency [1, 2], here referred to
as the “comparator model” (Figure 1A), which tries to
explain delusions of influence in schizophrenia. Ac-
cording to this model, the sensory consequences of a
given motor command are predicted (“predicted state”).
By comparing this predicted state with the actual sen-
sory afference (“actual state”), we are able to attribute
self-agency to sensory events: If both signals match,
we are the authors of the sensory information. If they
do not match, the difference is attributed to the envi-
ronment. Such a comparator mechanism might repre-
sent a specific faculty of the self, one that is disturbed
in certain schizophrenia patients [1–3]. In fact, patients
suffering from hallucinations and/or delusions of influ-
ence have difficulties in the distinction of self-produced
and externally produced actions [4–6].
In order to investigate the mechanisms underlying
these disorders of agency, we investigated the ability of
schizophrenia patients to discriminate between retinal
image motion resulting either from their own smooth-
pursuit eye movements or from external motion sources.
While such smooth pursuit is performed, the images of
a stationary environment inevitably slip over the retina
with a velocity equivalent to that of the eye rotation. If
we relied on retinal information only, we would misattri-
bute the image motion to the environment rather than
to ourselves and thus misperceive the world as moving.
This interpretation is avoided by comparing the actual
image slip with the amount of image motion predicted
on the basis of the eye-movement motor command. If
both signals match, the retinal image slip is interpreted
as being self produced, whereas if they do not match,
the difference must be attributed to the external world
[9, 10]. Thus, within the framework of motion percep-
tion, self-agency is explained by the same comparator
mechanism (Figure 1A). Accordingly, the amount of re-
sidual (misattributed) background motion perceived
during smooth pursuit across a stationary environment
is a highly specific behavioral probe to validate putative
deficits in the comparator mechanism in schizophrenia
patients; a greater amount of residual motion should
be perceived by subjects suffering from delusions of
influence. This is, as shown here, indeed the case.
In 14 schizophrenia patients and 14 healthy control
subjects, we estimated the amount of external back-
ground motion that had to be added in order to com-
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1120Figure 1. Perceptual Cancellation of Self-
Induced Sensory Information
(A) The figure shows the comparator model
[1, 2]. According to this model, the motor
system can be considered a control system
with the input being a “desired state” and
the output being the “actual state estimate.”
On the basis of these two representations,
the system specifies a sequence of motor
commands in order to reach a certain goal.
For example, during smooth pursuit of a
moving target (see left sketch), subjects try
to stabilize the retinal image of the moving
object on the fovea to improve vision (de-
sired state). To achieve this goal, appropriate
motor commands have to be generated. This
process depends on feedback control. By
comparison of the desired and the actually
estimated state, a motor error, which is fed
back to the system to improve its functioning
(solid lines), can be calculated. Moreover,
the system makes predictions on the out-
come of our behavior on the basis of a given
motor command (“predicted state”). Such
predictions can be used for feed-forward
control (central monitoring) of the movement
(dotted lines) but also to remove sensory
feedback that is self produced (dashed
lines). By the latter comparison, self-agency
can be attributed to sensory events: If the
predicted state matches the estimated ac-
tual state, the afferent information is self-
produced, whereas if these signals do not
match, the difference must be attributed to the environment. Accordingly, we perceive a pursued object as moving while the world (random-
dot background) appears to be stationary.
(B) By varying the speed of a structured background during horizontal smooth pursuit, we determined the amount of image motion necessary
to render this background perceptually stationary (50% rightward and 50% leftward answers). The larger the deviation of this point of
subjective stationarity from the optimum of 0°/s, the less precise the compensation of the self-induced background-image motion, namely
the compensated reafference (CR).
(C) The amount of compensated reafference (CR) is plotted as a function of target velocity and separately for the groups of schizophrenia
patients and healthy controls. In addition, we show the grand average for both groups as well as a comparison of the subgroup of patients
suffering from delusions of influence versus their matched controls. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.pensate the percept of residual background motion, s
prendering the background stationary (compare Figure
1B). In other words, at this point of subjective stationar-
tity (PSS), the amount of external velocity of the back-
ground equals the amount of motion perceived during 6
dpursuit across a stationary background. Having deter-
mined the background velocity at the PSS, we could C
acalculate the fraction of self-induced retinal image slip,
compensated for by the sensory predictor. The size of t
hthis “compensated reafference” (CR) is given by equa-
tion (1): H
a
CR = [Vreafference− Vextern] /Vreafference (1) s
oVextern represents the external velocity (V) of the
ebackground at the PSS, whereas Vreafference reflects the
sfull amount of self-induced image motion and is given
oby the velocity of the smooth-pursuit eye movement.
kAccording to equation (1), the closer Vextern at the PSS
iis to the optimal value of 0°/sec (stationarity), the better
athe compensation (CR approaching 100%). On the
gother hand, if the PSS equals eye velocity, (i.e., Vextern =
eVreafference), there is no compensation at all (CR = 0%).
sNote that this measure is independent of the actual eye
fvelocity and therefore can be compared for different
target velocities irrespectively of possible differences in tmooth-pursuit performance between controls and the
atient group.
We measured the CR for each individual subject in
he two groups for three different target velocities (3.4°/s,
.8°/s, and 13.6°/s). The mean values of each group are
epicted in Figure 1C. As is obvious from this figure,
R values of both groups, patients (57%, grand
verage) and controls (71%), were significantly smaller
han the optimum of 100%. This poor performance in
ealthy subjects might be surprising at first glance.
owever, this result simply reflects the fact that the
bility to compensate for the retinal consequences of
mooth pursuit under laboratory conditions is sufficient
nly if the conditions mimic those prevailing in a natural
nvironment. For instance, backgrounds that are con-
iderably smaller than a full visual field and are, more-
ver, presented only shortly, as in our experiment, are
nown to result in a nonoptimal compensation of self-
nduced image slip [e.g., 11]. More important than the
bsolute size of compensation for the configuration
iven is the question of whether there might be differ-
nces in performance between healthy controls and
chizophrenia patients. Although there was a tendency
or the patients to compensate less than the controls,
his difference (14%) did not reach significance for any
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1121of the target velocities used (two-way ANOVA with the
factors “group” [F(1, 78) = 2.29, n.s.] and “target veloc-
ity” [F(2, 78) = 0.04, n.s.] and their “interaction” [F(2,
78) = 0.08, n.s.]).
One might argue that the lack of a consistent differ-
ence between groups might have been due to the pa-
tients’ deviating from the normal CR in individually vary-
ing directions, balancing out on the group level. This
does not seem to be the case, as shown by an analysis
of a “CR deviation” measure, given by the root-mean-
squares of the individual CR differences from the CR
average of healthy subjects and calculated for each
subject and each target velocity separately. Thus, the
smaller this standardized measure of absolute devia-
tion, the more accurate the compensation of self-induced
image motion with respect to reference values obtained
in normal controls. CR deviation, averaged across
the three velocities tested, amounted to 36% (grand
average) in schizophrenia patients and 32% in healthy
controls. This small difference between groups did not
reach statistical significance (two-way ANOVA with the
factors “group” [F(1, 78) = 0.32, n.s.] and “target veloc-
ity” [F(2, 78) = 0.82, n.s.] and their “interaction” [F(2,
78) = 0.58, n.s.]). Furthermore, putative differences in
the CR or CR deviation were not veiled by abnormalities
in smooth-pursuit eye movements, coherent (“global”)-
motion perception, or increased response variability,
which have been regularly reported for schizophrenia
patients [e.g., 12–14] (for further details please see Fig-
ure S1 in the Supplemental Data available with this arti-
cle online).
In summary, this first line of comparison of patients
and healthy controls failed to reveal any indication of a
malfunctioning of the comparator mechanism in schizo-
phrenia patients. However, according to the line of argu-
ments put forward in the introduction, one should ex-
pect such deficits only in those schizophrenia patients
suffering from disorders of agency. In fact, when we
only compared the CR measure for a subgroup of pa-
tients showing delusions of influence (51%, grand
average, n = 11) with the CR values of their matched
controls (75%, compare Figure 1C), these patients were
significantly impaired in their ability to compensate for
the amount of self-induced image motion during
smooth pursuit (two-way ANOVA with the factors
“group” [F(1, 60) = 4.63, p < 0.05] and “target velocity”
[F(2, 60) = 0.06, n.s.] and their “interaction” [F(2, 60) =
0.01, n.s.]). This deficit appears specific because it was
not accompanied by any impairment in smooth pursuit
(two-way ANOVA with the factors “group” [F(1, 60) =
0.00, n.s.] and “target velocity” [F(2, 60) = 361.35, p <
0.001] and their “interaction” [F(2, 60) = 0.17, n.s.]) or
coherent-motion perception in this subgroup of pa-
tients (t test [t(26) = 1.80, n.s.]).
In order to test this finding more rigorously, we per-
formed a regression analysis within the group of
schizophrenia patients as a whole. Such a within-group
analysis has the advantage that nonspecific effects
caused by medication, effects that differed only mini-
mally between patients, can be ruled out. Thus, we
correlated specific aspects of our patients’ psychopa-
thology as assessed by the Scale for Assessment of
Positive Symptoms (SAPS, see Experimental Pro-
cedures) with our four task-specific perceptual and be-havioral measures: (a) CR; (b) CR deviation; (c) smooth-
pursuit eye velocity; and (d) detection thresholds for
coherent-motion perception. Out of the regressions cal-
culated (n = 4), the only one that turned out to be signif-
icant was the one between the SAPS and the measure
of CR deviation (b: R2 = 0.52; p < 0.01, corrected for
multiple comparisons. a: R2 = 0.06. c: R2 = 0.07. d: R2 =
0.01, n.s.): The larger the score for the assessment of
positive symptoms, the less accurate the perceptual
compensation of self-induced retinal image motion of
the world. In the next step, we asked whether any spe-
cific class of symptoms assessed by the SAPS might
be predominately related with a reduced ability to can-
cel out smooth-pursuit-induced sensory information.
To this end, we performed an additional statistical
analysis in which we used several items of the SAPS
as further regressors: (I) hallucinations; (II) delusions;
(III) residual positive symptoms; (II-a) delusions of influ-
ence; and (II-b) residual delusions. Each of these sub-
scores was again correlated with the four behavioral
measures (a–d; n = 20 regressions). As shown in Figure
2A, CR deviation was correlated with score II (i.e., delu-
sions [R2 = 0.59; p < 0.05, corrected for multiple com-
parisons; also see Figure 2B]) rather than with halluci-
nations (score I: R2 = 0.25; n.s.) or other positive
symptoms (score III: R2 = 0.01; n.s.). Score II considered
different types of delusions, which are reflected by sub-
scores II-a and II-b. Out of these, only the one describ-
ing delusions of influence (subscore II-a) showed a sig-
nificant correlation with CR deviation, too (R2 = 50; p <
0.05, corrected for multiple comparisons; see Figure
2A). In other words, the correlation between the SAPS
and CR deviation was mainly accounted for by the con-
tribution of delusions (score II)—more specifically, delu-
sions of influence (subscore II-a). Besides, none of the
remaining behavioral parameters (i.e., the compen-
sated reafference, smooth-pursuit velocity, or coher-
ent-motion perception), did correlate with any of the
symptoms assessed in the group of schizophrenia pa-
tients in this second line of analyses.
Discussion
This study tried to shed light on the mechanisms un-
derlying disorders of agency in schizophrenia patients.
It was guided by the idea that such patients might have
problems representing the predicted sensory conse-
quences of their own actions and that they might there-
fore misattribute sensory events as arising from the
environment rather than from themselves [1–3]. The
perception of visual motion during pursuit eye move-
ments is a task that is highly dependent on faithful in-
formation on the visual consequences of the eye move-
ments and thus offers a simple model to gauge the
availability of reliable sensory predictions in schizo-
phrenia patients [9, 10]. Although the group of schizo-
phrenia patients as a whole did not deviate from the
group of healthy controls in any of the perceptual and
behavioral measures considered, those patients suffer-
ing from delusions of influence were more impaired in
predicting the visual consequences of their eye move-
ments the more they suffered from this kind of self-dis-
turbance.
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1122Figure 2. Correlation of Positive Symptoms with Behavioral Parameters
(A) Summary of all correlation coefficients (R2) obtained in a multiple-correlation analysis between different scores for the assessment of
positive symptoms (for details, see Experimental Procedures) and several behavioral measures (as described in detail in Results). The corre-
sponding p values are indicated by the horizontal lines. P values were adjusted for multiple comparisons according to the Bonferroni pro-
cedure.
(B) Delusions (score II, SAPS) plotted as a function of the deviation of the compensated reafference (CR). Note that the two factors exhibit a
highly significant correlation (compare with [A]).A possible concern could be that the close relation- a
qship between delusions of influence and impaired per-
ceptual compensation of smooth-pursuit-induced im- w
sage motion, as described here, might actually be the
consequence of common dependencies of both on a a
fthird functionality. Specifically, both might be indepen-
dent expressions of a more global cognitive dysfunc- r
ation. On the other hand, in view of the frequent ac-
counts of disturbed-pursuit eye movements [e.g., 12] t
tand deficits in visual-motion processing [e.g., 13, 14] in
schizophrenia patients, the impaired perceptual com- w
dpensation during pursuit might be secondary to distur-
bances of these more elementary functional modules. h
aWe think that these concerns can be dispelled. First, it
has been shown convincingly that self-monitoring defi- a
dcits in schizophrenia patients are not correlated with
widespread, general disturbances of cognitive func- w
ttions [15, 16]. Second, the amount of delusions did not
show any significant dependency on smooth-pursuit n
ogain or the visual perception of coherent motion in the
absence of eye movements in our study. The lack of t
msuch correlations most likely reflects the individual psy-
chopathology of our patients, who predominantly ex- s
rhibit positive symptoms: There seems to be no interre-
lation between these symptoms and the initiation and n
mmaintenance of smooth-pursuit eye movements [17]
and thus the underlying processing of visual motion [
c[18]. This does not invalidate the idea that pursuit
disturbances [e.g., 12] as well as deficits in visual-motion m
bperception [13, 14] are more frequent in the population
of schizophrenia patients as a whole. However, it rules t
sout the possibility that the perceptual-compensation
deficit observed by us could be secondary to such m
mproblems.
Several studies have reported disorders of agency in s
tschizophrenia via self-attribution tasks similar to the
one described here; the experimental strategy was usu- elly based on movements (and their sensory conse-
uences) that were fed back visually to the subjects
ith well-defined distortions. The question was whether
ubjects were able to detect these distortions and how
ccurate self-attribution judgments were made. Visual
eedback on the action (hand and finger movements,
eaching, drawing, etc.) was manipulated in the spatial
nd the temporal domain [5, 6, 19–21]. Thus, rather
han estimating sensory predictions or the outcome of
heir comparison with the actual afferent signal—as it
as done here—all of these previous studies measured
etection thresholds: Schizophrenia patients always
ad problems in recognizing feedback manipulations
nd tended to attribute what they saw to their own
gency, even if sensory feedback information was clearly
ifferent from the action they performed. This behavior,
hich was termed “hyperassociation” or “overattribu-
ion,” cannot be explained by the comparator mecha-
ism—if patients are not able to form representations
f the predicted sensory consequences of their actions,
hey should misattribute self-produced sensory infor-
ation to external sources rather than exhibit hyperas-
ociations. However, such overattribution might simply
eflect the indispensability of the comparator mecha-
ism: Subtle distortions of visual feedback on self-
ovements, as applied in the aforementioned studies
5, 6, 19–21], are no longer likely to be detected if the
omparison with a precise [22] and continuously opti-
ized [10] internal prediction on the outcome of our
ehavior is lacking. As a consequence, the use of ex-
ernal information for self-ascriptions (for instance, vi-
ion [23]) gains more importance. On the one hand, this
ight lead to hyperassociations if external cues are
anipulated experimentally. On the other hand, an epi-
odic misattribution of self-produced sensory informa-
ion to external sources might result whenever such
xternal cues are not available—one of the major hall-
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associations seem to be compatible with the compara-
tor model. However, as already mentioned above, they
do not reflect compelling evidence for its implementa-
tion. In contrast, the behavioral probe used in the pre-
sent study directly reflected the output of the compari-
son between predicted and actually estimated sensory
feedback (Figure 1A), indicating a specific impairment
in patients suffering from delusions of influence: These
patients might not be able to form an appropriate pre-
diction on the outcome of their behavior, a major key
to the ascription of self-agency to sensory events.
Experimental Procedures
Subjects
A group of 14 schizophrenia patients participated in this study (7
men, 7 women, average age = 29), and two groups of age-matched
healthy control subjects (as specified below) participated in this
study. All subjects had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity
and gave their written informed consent according to the declara-
tion of Helsinki. Schizophrenia patients were recruited from the
Psychiatric University Hospital in Tübingen, Germany. All patients
met the DSM-IV criteria for schizophrenia. Furthermore, all of them
met the criteria for the paranoid subtype of the disorder with pre-
dominant delusions and hallucinations. Negative symptoms were
only moderately present in our patients. All of them were medi-
cated with atypical neuroleptics. Hallucinations and delusions were
quantified by the Scale for Assessment of Positive Symptoms
(SAPS) [24]. The mean SAPS was 30.2 ± 8.8 (95% confidence in-
terval). The following subscores were assessed: score I hallucina-
tions, 8.8 ± 4.5 (average ± 95% confidence interval); score II delu-
sions: 16.8 ± 5; score III residual positive symptoms [i.e., SAPS
minus (score I + II)], 4.6 ± 1.9; score II-a delusions of influence, 6.1 ±
2.8; score II-b residual delusions (i.e., score II minus score II-a),
9.9 ± 3.2.
Experimental Design
All psychophysical tests followed an adaptive staircase procedure
(PEST) [25], forcing subjects to select one of two alternative re-
sponses in an individual trial. Thresholds, as defined below, were
determined by means of a probit analysis [26]. Stimuli were back
projected on a translucent screen (frame rate 60 Hz, 1280 × 1024
pixels) in a dark experimental room. Viewing distance was 148 cm.
During all tests, eye movements were monitored with an infrared-
video eyetracker. Recordings were stored and analyzed online at a
sampling rate of 50 Hz by a workstation that also controlled the
presentation of the stimuli. When deviations of eye position from
the position of the given fixation target exceeded a certain prede-
fined amount (see below), they were fed back acoustically as er-
rors, and the corresponding trials were discarded. Eye movements
were analyzed according to procedures described in detail else-
where [10].
In the first experiment, we measured the amount of residual im-
age motion perceived during smooth-pursuit eye movements
across a stationary structured background. Pursuit was elicited by
a red dot (diameter 15 min of arc), which moved from left to the
right at a constant velocity of either 3.4°/s, 6.8°/s, or 13.6°/s span-
ning a visual angle of 5°, 10°, or 20°, respectively. Trials in which
eye position deviated by more than 1°, 2°, or 4° from the fixation
target, respectively, were detected online and discarded from fur-
ther analysis. The percentage of such “invalid” trials did not differ
between groups or for different target velocities (two-way ANOVA
with the factors “group” [F(1, 78) = 0.49, n.s.] and “target velocity”
[F(2, 78) = 2.08, n.s.] and their “interaction” [F(2, 78) = 1.70, n.s.]).
Different target velocities were presented in separate blocks. The
order of these blocks was randomly selected for each subject.
Temporally located in the middle of the target sweep, a background
pattern was presented for 200 ms. This background stimulus sub-
tended 42° × 38° of visual angle and consisted of 230 white dots
(diameter 15 min of arc, 3.6 cd/m2) on an otherwise dark back-ground (0.0 cd/m2). Subjects were asked to report the direction of
perceived background motion, which was varied by the staircase
procedure in order to estimate the point of perceived stationarity
(PSS) of the background. The PSS was defined as the background
velocity giving on average 50% leftward and 50% rightward re-
sponses. The velocity of the background at the PSS is a direct
estimate for the ability to compensate self-induced image motion,
namely the compensated reafference (CR; see equation 1 in Re-
sults). Because there was no interaction between CR values of the
schizophrenia patients and target velocity, these measures were
pooled for the correlation with the individual clinical scores. Over-
all, ten men and four women (average age 27) served as healthy
control subjects.
In a second experiment, we tested for the ability to detect coher-
ent motion in a random-dot display. Subjects were confronted with
two rectangular apertures (18° × 18° each), centered at 2.5° right
and left of the fixation point. Each aperture contained 100 dots
(diameter 15 min of arc, 3.6 cd/m2) moving at 6°/s and whose life-
time was unlimited. Presentation time was 200 ms. Whereas all
dots in one of the apertures moved in random directions, a fraction
of the dots in the other aperture moved coherently in a common
direction, chosen randomly between 0° and 360°. The choice of the
aperture containing coherent motion and the percentage of coher-
ently moving dots in that aperture changed from trial to trial, the
latter as determined by the PEST-staircase procedure. On each
trial, subjects were required to indicate, while maintaining fixation
of the central cue, the aperture containing coherently moving dots.
Eye position was controlled online as described earlier, and the trial
was discarded if the eyes left a position window of 4° centered on
the fixation cue. The motion-detection threshold was defined as
the “coherency level” at which subjects responded correctly in
75% of the time. Ten men and four women (average age 29) served
as healthy control subjects.
Supplemental Data
One supplemental figure can be found in the Supplemental Data
available with this article online at http://www.current-biology.com/
cgi/content/full/15/12/1119/DC1/.
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